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1 Introduction
Mass media is believed to play a powerful role in democracies. It is often referred to as the fourth
estate. It reaches an immense audience, and its content can affect a wide range of outcomes, including
political behavior such as voting.1 However, the ability of the media to perform its prescribed role as
the “watchdog” of democracy has come under question as observers point to an increasing number of
instances when media content is distorted by the government.2 Bennett et al. (2008, p. 8) summarizes
the motivation behind these concerns: “The democratic role of the press is defined... by those moments
when government deception or incompetence compels journalists to find and bring credible challenges
to public attention and hold rulers accountable. This accountability function of the U.S. press has been
weakened in the contemporary era, and its standing is sorely in need of greater examination”.3
This paper attempts to make progress on this important question by assessing the extent of govern-
ment distortion of the news in the United States. Our study aims to determine whether the anecdotal
and case evidence on government manipulation reflects isolated incidents or systematic distortion that
could be a symptom of deeper and more fundamental concerns. In other words, we ask whether a
democratic government can systematically distort news coverage from independently owned outlets.
This question has received very little attention in the literature thus far.
Our study proceeds in three steps. First, to motivate our investigation, Section 2 documents that the
U.S. government often attempted to influence news coverage of human rights practices of their political
allies. We rely on qualitative evidence from political scientists as well as internal government memos
that explicitly state government objectives and tactics for a large number of cases. The bulk of the
evidence come from memos that were declassified as part of the Iran-Contra investigation and mostly
pertain to the last decade or so of the Cold War.
1Recent studies have shown that media can affect voting behavior (e.g., Prat and Stromberg, 2005; Gentzkow, 2006;
DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Chiang and Knight, 2011; Enikolopov et al., 2011; and Adena et al. (2013)), other political
behavior (Paluck, 2008; Gerber et al., 2009; Olken, 2009), and social outcomes such as literacy (Gentzkow and Shapiro,
2008a) female empowerment (Jensen and Oster, 2009) and fertility (La Ferrara et al., 2008).
2Numerous books written by political scientists and former journalists voice this concern. Prominent examples include
Bennett et al. (2008), Cook (1998) and Thomas (2006). Also see the works referenced in Bennett et al. (2008) and Cook
(1998) for the large body of work about the media and the U.S. government from media and political science scholars.
3The quote from Pulitzer was originally printed in the North American Review (1904). More controversial works doc-
umenting the influence of the U.S. government on the media include the well-known work of Chomsky (2011), where he
compares the compliance of the American media with U.S. government’s directives to that of the Pravda and the Russian
government.
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Second, Section 3 provides a conceptual framework for the empirical analysis. We combine the
recent theories of endogenous news coverage developed by Prat and Stromberg (2005, 2011) and
Stromberg (1999, 2004a, 2004b) with a theory of media manipulation by Besley and Prat (2006) to
provide one plausible explanation of why or how the U.S. government manipulates news and to pro-
vide empirically testable implications of whether there is any government distortion in our context. We
also discuss alternative explanations to our results after we present them in Section 7.
Finally, the principal contribution of our study is to estimate the causal effect of political alliance
with the United States on news coverage of human rights abuses in five large U.S. newspapers (New
York Times, Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times and Wall Street Journal). The two
main difficulties are the measurement of news coverage and alliance, and causal identification. To
measure news coverage, we conduct text analysis to construct the number of news articles of human
rights abuses for each country in each year. As a proxy for alliance with the United States, we use the
fraction of votes that a country makes in agreement with the United States in United Nations General
Assembly resolutions over which the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia, post 1991) disagree.
Our data includes all of the years for which we were able to conduct text analysis, 1946-2010. Our use
of voting in the UN General Assembly as a proxy of U.S. alliance follows Alesina and Dollar (2000)
and Qian and Yanagizawa-Drott (2009).4
The difficulty in causal identification arises from the fact that alliance and news coverage of human
rights abuses can be jointly determined by a third omitted variable. For example, civil war may both
reduce the value of a country as an ally to the United States and worsen its human rights abuses, which
would result in more news coverage. Alternatively, there may be reverse causality. For example, more
news coverage about human rights abuses may reduce the willingness of the U.S. government to ally
itself with a foreign nation. To address these two problems, we use a difference-in-differences strategy
and estimate the interaction effect of our proxy for alliance and rotating membership in the United
Nations Security Council. The logic of the strategy is that allies are strategically valuable to the U.S.
government, and this value increases when they are on the Council because they are able to vote on
important UN resolutions.
4Alesina and Dollar (2000) finds that voting with the U.S. in the General Assembly is positively correlated with U.S.
foreign aid receipts. We discuss Qian and Yanagizawa-Drott (2009) later in the introduction.
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Our empirical strategy builds on insights from two earlier works. Kuziemko and Werker (2006)
finds that Council membership can significantly increase a foreign country’s strategic value to the U.S.
government. Qian and Yanagizawa-Drott (2009) finds that the U.S. State Department reports allies as
having better human rights records than non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International
report them to have. To address the possibility that voting patterns in the General Assembly may be
endogenous, we use a two year lagged measure. The baseline specification includes country fixed
effects, which control for all time-invariant characteristics across countries such as cultural affinity with
the United States that can affect the degree of alliance, Council membership and/or news coverage; and
year fixed effects, which control for any changes over time that influence all countries equally. In
addition, it controls for the interactions of alliance and the full vector of year fixed effects and the
interactions of Council membership with the full vector of year fixed effects. These additional controls
allow the importance of alliance and Council membership to vary fully flexibly over time. The main
hypothesis is that if the U.S. government reduced news coverage of the human rights abuses of countries
that were strategically important, then the interaction effect of Council membership and alliance will
be negative.
We find that for the full sample (1946–2010), the interaction effect of Council membership and
alliance is negative and statistically significant. The result is robust to several alternative measures of
alliance, including lagged military alliance, whether the legal origin of a country was European but
not socialist or communist, and lagged military aid from the United States. As a placebo exercise, we
show that controlling for the interaction of Council membership and U.S. military aid, the interaction
of Council membership and U.S. economic aid has no effect.
Next, we investigate whether the effects are more prominent during the Reagan and Bush Sr. ad-
ministrations, which is the focus of the anecdotal evidence of government manipulation. We find that
this is indeed the case. There is no significant effect before, from the Truman to Carter administrations,
or afterwards, during the Clinton and Bush Jr. administrations.
Thus, our results are consistent with the presence of government distortions during 1981–1992.
This interpretation relies on the assumption that there were no other forces that were simultaneously
correlated with news coverage, Council membership, and political alliance with the United States. We
do not take this as given and provide a large body of evidence in support of our interpretation. First, we
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show that the timing of our reduced form effects corresponds with entry onto and exit from the Council.
Second, we show that the response of annual U.S. State Department reports of human rights abuses of
foreign countries to the interaction of alliance with the U.S. government and UNSC membership is very
similar to that of news coverage, which is consistent with our interpretation that the interaction effect
captures the influence of U.S. government manipulation. Third, we show that Council membership
does not have similar effects on reports by Amnesty International or several proxies of human rights
behavior and institutional quality. These results go against the alternative explanation that our results
reflect changes in actual human rights practice. Finally, we show a significant and negative effect on
the number of articles about human rights abuses as a fraction of total articles about a given country.
This goes against the alternative that our results are driven by changes in overall news coverage. See
Section 6 for a detailed discussion.
For policymakers, our findings send a mixed message. On the one hand, they confirm the case ev-
idence from the 1980s that systematic government-driven distortions existed for independently owned
and highly competitive media outlets in a democratic regime. On the other hand, the fact that we only
observe distortions during two presidential administrations may be viewed optimistically as indicating
that such distortions cannot exist indefinitely in the U.S. context. For example, Gentzkow et al. (2015)
finds that the government in power has little influence over news composition in the historical U.S.
context.
In our focus on the government’s influence of media coverage, our study is most closely related
to Besley and Prat (2006). It also builds directly on the pioneering work of Besley and Prat (2006),
Durante and Knight (2012), Prat and Stromberg (2005, 2011) and Stromberg (1999, 2004a, 2004b) by
adapting the frameworks developed in these papers and applying them to a novel empirical context.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to provide rigorous evidence that government
distortion has systematically existed in the United States. In doing so, we add to the important empirical
literature on the determinants of news coverage. Our study differs from previous studies by focusing
on government-driven distortions in a democratic regime. In this sense, we are related to recent studies
that find evidence of government influence of the media in Italy under Silvio Berlusconi (Durante and
Knight, 2012) and in Argentina through government advertising (DiTella and Franceschelli, 2011).
Second, we add to the small but growing number of political economy studies that explore the
4
causes and consequences of U.S. government foreign policy. In our focus on the Cold War era, our
study is most closely related to Dube et al.’s (2011) study of U.S. covert actions on U.S. firm stock
prices, and Berger et al.’s (2009) and Berger et al.’s (2010) studies of U.S. Cold War policies on trade.
It broadens the scope of this literature by examining the effect of U.S. foreign policy on the American
public. In using the degree to which a country votes with the United States in the UN General Assembly
on issues for which the United States votes in opposition to the Soviet Union to proxy for alliance, we
build on our earlier paper, Qian and Yanagizawa-Drott (2009). The current paper differs from Qian and
Yanagizawa-Drott (2009) in studying the additional advantage of Council membership and examining
news coverage as an outcome.
Finally, our examination of United Nations Security Council members builds on earlier works by
Kuziemko and Werker (2006) and Alesina and Dollar (2000) that were discussed earlier. In using Coun-
cil membership as a proxy for a country’s strategic value to the United States, we build on Kuziemko
and Werker (2006), which finds that Council membership in years that are strategically important for
the U.S. government results in higher U.S. aid. They proxy for the importance of the year with the num-
ber of New York Times articles about the Security Council and then estimate the interaction effect of
this measure and Council membership on foreign aid from the United States. Our study complements
theirs in examining news coverage of human rights abuse as the outcome.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background. Section 3 summarizes the
conceptual framework. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy. Section 5 describes the data. Section
6 presents the main empirical results. Section 7 discusses alternative interpretations. Section 8 offers
concluding remarks.
2 Background
2.1 “White Propaganda” During the Reagan and Bush Sr. Administrations
The main period of our study, 1981–1992, was characterized by a commitment to fight communism on
the part of the American government, which climaxed during the Reagan administration (1981–88) and
continued with the Bush Sr. administration (1989–1992). As with all of the Cold War, rivalry between
the two superpowers was expressed through military coalitions, propaganda and proxy wars (e.g., the
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Soviet war in Afghanistan 1979–89). The Cold War ended in 1991 when the U.S.S.R. dissolved.
An important feature of the Cold War in the United States was the focus on the superior morality
of the West. The U.S. government and news media often described its allies as “good” and the Eastern
Bloc and its allies as “evil”. Recently declassified files stored in the U.S. National Security Archives
document both the method and the motives for the U.S. government to influence the press coverage of
the human rights practices of its political allies.
The government needed public support for its political actions, which included public approval of
its political allies. Given the focus on morality, it followed that U.S. allies should have better human
rights practices than Eastern Bloc allies.5 For the most part, U.S. government support for its Cold War
allies with poor human rights abuses ended with the Cold War. Internal memos show that the execu-
tive branch believed that one of the ways to shape public opinion against opponents was to exaggerate
human rights abuses in those countries and emphasize that amongst other things, they were “evil”,
practiced “forced conscription” or engaged in the “persecution of the church.” Conversely, the govern-
ment attempted to increase support for political allies by calling them “freedom fighters,” “religious,”
or simply “good” (Jacobwitz, 1985b).
During the Reagan administration, the task of influencing press coverage was officially delegated
to the Office of Public Diplomacy (OPD). The OPD was part of the State Department and worked
closely with the National Security Council (NSC). Its explicit purpose was to influence public and
congressional opinion to garner support for the President’s strong anti-communist agenda in a “public
action” program (Parry and Kornblub, 1988). The memo specifies that audiences for the information
campaign include the U.S. media (Jacobwitz, 1985b).
“...we can and must go over the heads of our Marxist opponents directly to the Amer-
ican people. Our targets would be within the United States... the general public [and]
media.” – Kate Semerad, an external relationship official at the Agency for International
Development (AID) in 1983.
5For studies on U.S. government favoritism of human rights reports of its Cold War allies, see studies such as Carleton
and Stohl (1985), Mitchell and McCormick (1988), Poe et al. (2001), and Qian and Yanagizawa-Drott (2009).
In the case of the The New York Times, which published an international version under the title of The International
Herald Tribune, manipulation could also affect the opinion of foreign readers. Also, influencing the press could also affect
congressional opinion, whose favor was often necessary for legislative purposes (Blanton and Blanton, 2007).
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Government methods for influencing the media can be broadly categorized into two groups. First, the
government can attempt to directly manipulate news reports by exerting pressure on editorial boards or
incentivizing journalists. The OPD monitored news reports by the American media and would directly
confront journalists and editors in order to convince them to change the reports (Schultz, 2001). Upon
the appearance of news reports that did not conform to the wishes of the OPD, officials could press the
owners and editorial boards to change their journalists in the field. The OPD also dealt directly with
journalists using a carrot-and-stick strategy. For example, uncooperative journalists became the targets
of character assassination meant to induce skepticism about the information they reported and were
sometimes even forcibly removed from foreign countries from which they were reporting.6 In contrast,
journalists seen as cooperative to the administration’s agenda were rewarded with increased access to
government information. For example, an OPD memo stated that certain favorable correspondents had
“open invitations for personal briefings” (Cohen, 2001).7
Second, the government can manipulate the supply of information and provide disinformation.
Information can be disseminated through the numerous government affiliated publicity events and pub-
lications. One such publication is the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, which we will
discuss later in the paper. In a letter to House Speaker Patrick Buchanan, the Deputy Director for
Public Diplomacy for Latin American and the Caribbean (SLDP), Jonathan Miller, described how the
OPD was carrying out “white propaganda” operations. This included writing opinion articles under
false names and placing them in leading newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal (Hamilton and
Inouye, 1987; Miller, 2001). Similar opinion editorials were planted in the New York Times and the
Washington Post (Brooks, 1987). The OPD paid extra attention to prominent journalists. In general,
the OPD flooded the media, academic institutions and other interested groups with information. For
example, in 1982, the OPD booked more than 1,500 speaking engagements with editorial boards, ra-
dio, and television interviewers, distributed materials to 1,600 college libraries, 520 political science
6One famous case was the removal of New York Times reporter Raymond Bonner from El Salvador after his unfavorable
reporting of the massacre by the Salvadoran government. The U.S government pressured the NYT to recall Bonner (Parry
and Kornblub, 1988). Other outlets such as the Wall Street Journal subsequently published articles criticizing the NYT for
publishing Bonner’s reports.
7Blanton and Blanton (2007) provides an overview of all the actions taken by the Office for Public Diplomacy (OPD)
during the Reagan Administration. For detailed accounts of when the media allows the government to distort reports, see
Bennet, Bennet et al. (2007) and Thomas (2006). Also, see Latham (2012) for a study of how career concerns affect intelli-
gence reports in the CIA.
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faculties, 122 editorial writers, and 107 religious groups (Parry and Kornblub, 1988).
2.2 The United Nations
The United Nations (UN), a source of much of the diplomatic influence and the principal outlet for
the foreign relations initiatives of non-superpower countries, was especially important during the Cold
War.8 Two of the five principal organs of the UN are the General Assembly and the Security Council.
During the period of our study, there were approximately 150 member states, of which more than two-
thirds were developing countries. The General Assembly votes on many resolutions brought forth by
sponsoring states. Most resolutions, while symbolic of the sense of the international community, are
not enforceable as a legal or practical matter. The General Assembly does, however, have authority to
make final decisions in areas such as the UN budget, and in case of a split vote in the Council when no
veto is exercised, the issue goes for a vote in the General Assembly.
The Security Council comprises fifteen member states. Council members have more power than
General Assembly members because the Council can make decisions which are binding for all UN
member states, including economic sanctions and the use of armed force (Chapter Seven of the UN
Charter). There are ten temporary seats that are held for two-year terms, each one beginning on January
1st. Five are replaced each year. The members are elected by regional groups and confirmed by the
UN General Assembly. New members are typically announced the year before the term begins.9 There
are five permanent members (P5): China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.
These members hold veto power for blocking adoption of a resolution. Experts vary in their assessment
of the power of rotating members over important issues during our period of study. On the one hand,
rotating members cannot overturn vetoes and some political scientists argue that they have limited real
power (e.g., O’Neill, 1996). On the other hand, studies such as Voeten (2001) argue that P5 countries
prefer multilateral agreements, which, in turn, gives much power to rotating members. For example,
deadlocks on the Council can only occur if there is no veto and nine of the ten deadlocks that have ever
occurred in the history of the UN occurred during the Cold War.10
8For a detailed discussion of the history and institutions of the United Nations, see Malone (2004).
9Africa elects three members; blocs such as Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia, and Western Europe choose two
members each; and the Eastern European bloc chooses one member. Also, one of these members is an Arab country, alter-
nately from the Asian or African bloc. Members cannot serve consecutive terms, but are not limited in the number of terms
they can serve in total. There is often intense competition for these seats (Malone, 2000).
101956 Suez Crisis; 1956 Soviet Invasion of Hungary (Hungarian Revolution); 1958 Lebanon Crisis; 1960 Congo Crisis;
8
Rotating membership was standardized to be two years for all members. Prior to that, membership
was typically two years ( a small minority, ten members, had one year terms). Members are elected one
year prior to entry Malone (2000, p. 5).
3 Conceptual Framework
In the Online Appendix, we develop a framework of how alliance with the U.S. government and mem-
bership on the United Nations Security Council can interact to affect U.S. news coverage of human
rights abuses of foreign countries. The goals of our model are to provide one plausible explanation for
how the government influences human rights news coverage of foreign countries and to derive testable
implications to guide the empirical investigation of whether there is government distortion in the con-
text that we study. In particular, our model aims to provide an internally consistent explanation for
why Council membership could decrease the amount of news coverage for strongly allied countries,
while increasing the amount of coverage for countries that are not allied. After we present the empirical
results, we discuss alternative explanations in Section 7.
Specifically, our framework studies the incentives of the government to distort media coverage
of state repression in foreign countries. In our model, domestic voters care in part about the foreign
policy that the current U.S. administration pursues, but voters cannot directly and fully evaluate the
foreign policy (preferences) of the incumbent. Voters partly base their inferences on the behavior of
allied foreign countries that vote with the United States in the UN. News reports about human rights
violations of the allies serve as indicators of U.S. foreign policy, which affects the probability that the
incumbent U.S. administration will be voted out of the office.
Here, we sketch the basic intuition behind the model, which is formally presented in the Appendix.
In our model, “worse” countries are more likely to commit human rights violations and are more likely
to vote with the United States if the current administration’s foreign policy is bad (from the perspective
of U.S. voters). U.S. voters observe voting behavior and read about human rights violations to make
their inferences about the current administration’s type. There are two groups of voters. The first group
is interested in and reads the news about all foreign countries. As a result, voters in the first group make
1967 Six Days War; 1980 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; 1980 Israeli-Palestinian Conflict; 1981 South African occupation
of Namibia (South West Africa); 1982 Israeli Occupation of the Golan Heights (Golan Heights Law); 1997 Israeli-Palestinian
conflict (East Jerusalem and Israeli-occupied territories).
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inferences based on the behavior of all countries. The second group is interested only in the countries
that are currently on the UNSC. We do not formally model the reason for this. This assumption is
motivated by the fact that the Council discusses more important issues and/or has more power over
these issues. Alternatively, it could simply be because being on the Security Council acts as a focal
point for readers with limited interest in foreign policy. The second group solely bases its inferences
on the news coverage of Council members.
In our model, obtaining a seat on the Security Council generates two effects on news coverage. The
first is a demand effect. As a country becomes a member of the Council, more people are interested
in reading about it. In the absence of government interference, newspapers would then increase their
coverage of human rights abuses in these countries. The second effect is a distortion effect that comes
from the incentives of the government to manipulate the media. We show that if the number of countries
not on the Council is much larger than the number of countries on the Council (e.g., the General
Assembly), it is much cheaper for the U.S. government to manipulate public opinion by suppressing
news about Security Council countries than non-Security Council countries. Because voters in the first
group based their inferences on voting and human right violations of all countries, distorting news
coverage about one of them has little effect on the posterior beliefs of this group when the total number
of countries is large. In contrast, the voters in the second group base their inferences on the voting
behavior of a relatively small number of countries on the Council, and the distortions in the coverage
of one country has a large effect on the voters’ posterior beliefs about the current administration’s type.
As a result, when the country enters the Council, it is optimal for the U.S. government to significantly
intensify its distortion of news coverage. Moreover, this effect is monotone. The closer the foreign
country is aligned with the United States, the more severe the distortion will be.
Methodologically, our approach combines recent theories of endogenous news coverage developed
by Prat and Stromberg (2005, 2011) and Stromberg (1999, 2004a, 2004b) with a theory of media ma-
nipulation by Besley and Prat (2006). That voters in our model try to infer the quality of the government
policies from news reports and that newspaper coverage affects the posterior beliefs of the voters about
the quality of those policies is very similar to Durante and Knight (2012).11
11Durante and Knight (2012) studies the optimal choice of news outlet based on their ideological leaning. We abstract
from the differences in ideology and focus on the incentives of the government to manipulate news coverage.
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4 Empirical Strategy
The relationship between news coverage, U.S. alliance and Council membership can be characterized
as the following log-linear relationship:
Yit = α+β (Ait ×Cit)+δXit + γi+θt + εit , (1)
where the outcome variable, news coverage of human rights abuses, in country i in year t, Yit , is a func-
tion of: the interaction of alliance to the United States, Ait , and membership on the Security Council,
Cit ; a vector of country-year specific controls, Xit ; year fixed effects, δt ; and country fixed effects, γi.
Since the number of news articles is a count variable and there are many observations with the value
of zero, we estimate this model using a poisson regression.12 The standard errors are clustered at the
country level to adjust for serially correlated shocks within countries. The country fixed effects control
for all time-invariant differences across countries. Year fixed effects control for changes over time that
affect all countries similarly. Xit includes a vector of country-year controls, such as alliance interacted
with year fixed effects and Council membership interacted with year fixed effects. These controls al-
low the importance of alliance and Council membership to change over calendar years. Note that since
countries enter the Council on different calendar years, these controls are not collinear to the main
interaction term.
The identification strategy is conceptually similar to a differences-in-differences (DD) strategy. We
compare outcomes for countries when they are on the Council to when they are not, between countries
that are strongly allied to the United States to those that are less allied. β is the differential association
of Council membership and news coverage between countries that are not allied at all, Ait = 0, and
countries that are “perfectly” allied, Ait = 1. The goal of our empirical exercise is to test whether
βˆ < 0.
Interpreting the association between the interaction effect and news coverage as causal requires
the assumption that Council membership does not differentially affect allies in some way that will
influence news coverage through channels other than U.S. government distortion or reader demand.
Specifically, for the interaction term to overstate the true degree of government distortion, the omitted
12Appendix Table A.7 also presents the results from when we use OLS to estimate a log-linear specification.
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factor needs to reduce the increase in news coverage when a country enters the Security Council and
the reduction needs to be increasing with the level of political alliance with the United States. For
example, if improvement in human rights practices when entering the Council is positively correlated
with alliance, then the interpretation of our estimates will be confounded. We will carefully consider
this and other robustness concerns after we present the main results.
5 Data
This paper uses data that are constructed from numerous publicly available sources. For brevity, we
only describe the data for the main analysis in this section, which covers the period 1946-2010. Other
data will be discussed as they become relevant.
News coverage of human rights violations is measured as the number of newspaper articles about
human rights abuse in a given country. Following the definitions used by Freedom House and the
Political Terror Scale project, we define human rights as physical violence committed by the state onto
civilians. We calculate the number of articles based on a search of the text of articles in the ProQuest
Historical and National Newspapers database. Our measure of human rights coverage is the total
number of articles that results from the search per country per year. The newspapers we examine are
The New York Times (NYT, available 1946–2010), The Washington Post (WP, available 1946–97), The
Wall Street Journal (WSJ, available 1946–96), The Chicago Tribune (available 1946–90) and The Los
Angeles Times (L.A. Times, available 1946–90). These are the only newspapers within the ten highest
circulation papers for which we could conduct a full text search for the main period of our study.
Our measure includes both articles written by journalists employed by newspapers and stories
picked up from newswires and other sources, although the newspapers in our sample, and in partic-
ular the NYT and Washington Post, were known for original international news reporting.13 This does
not affect the interpretation of the results, but for completeness, we also examine the impact on articles
from newswires after we present the main results.
The most simple search algorithm would count the number of articles with a country’s name and
the phrases “human rights” or “human rights abuse”. The main difficulty with this procedure is that
13It is not possible to use automated text analysis to accurately and systematically distinguish between articles written by
different sources.
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it may capture articles that do not criticize the country’s human rights abuses. For example, it may
be an article commending the improvements of human rights (i.e., the lessening of abuses) in a given
country. This could induce measurement error in our dependent variable. As long as the error structure
is classical, it should not bias our results. Nevertheless, to minimize such measurement error, we im-
pose additional constraints by searching for articles containing the country’s name, the phrase “human
rights” and require at least one of the words or phrases that fall under the UN Declaration for Human
Rights (and that are therefore also commonly used in news articles on human rights abuse). These in-
clude “torture”, “violations”, “abuse”, “extrajudicial”, “execution”, “arbitrary arrests”, “imprisonment”
and “disappearances”. The logic is that journalists who wish to write about human rights abuse will
very likely research the official definition of human rights violations and then either consciously or
unintentionally use similar language as the official document.14
Our main proxy of alliance with the United States is the fraction of votes that a country votes in
agreement with the United States on issues for which the United States votes in opposition to the Soviet
Union (Russia, post 1991) in the UN General Assembly, Ait , where Ai ∈ [0,1].15 This is constructed
from resolution level data. We first identify the resolutions over which the United States and the Soviet
Union (Russia, post 1991) voted in opposition. Then, we calculate the fraction of such resolutions that
a given country voted in agreement with the United States. If a country abstains, then we code the
vote as a missing value. Thus, our main measure of alliance excludes abstentions.16 To avoid potential
endogeneity in contemporaneous voting patterns, we use a two-year lag since Council membership
14This constrained search could still include measurement error. For example, if an article names several countries in a
region, but only criticizes the human rights abuses of one of these countries (by including one of the search phrases we use),
then our search algorithm will result in one article about human rights abuse for each of the countries named in the article. We
know of no automatized way to completely avoid such measurement error when conducting a large scale automatic search
and explored whether this is likely to be a major problem in two ways. First, we examined the country names and years of the
200 observations with the most coverage (this is approximately 10% of the 1,937 observations that have any news coverage
in our sample). All of these are countries and years with known human rights abuses according to Amnesty International.
Online Appendix Table A.6 lists the top 100 observations during the Reagan and Bush administrations for brevity. Second,
we read a random sample of articles. Given logistical constraints and the purpose of making sure that our results are not
driven by measurement error, we randomly selected 200 articles from the Reagan and Bush administrations (1981-1992).
This is slightly less than 5% of the total number articles. We did not find any evidence that our measure over-counts the
number of articles about human rights abuses. Note that, as before, if this measurement error of the dependent variable is
classical, then it will not bias our estimates.
15We do not examine voting patterns in the Council because most issues are discussed prior to being put onto the agenda.
Therefore, the sample of issues voted on are not representative of the actual issues being deliberated by Council members.
16In Online Appendix Table A.5, we show that our results are qualitatively robust to an alternative measure where absten-
tions are coded as voting against the United States. The table also shows that our results are qualitatively robust to using a
dummy variable for alliance, where a country is allied if our main measure of alliance is above the sample median.
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typically lasts two years. We will show that our main result is qualitatively robust to several alternative
measures of alliance.
Data on Council membership are collected from The United Nations Security Council Membership
Roster.17 This is a time-varying dummy variable for whether a country is a rotating member of the
UN Security Council, Cit . The final sample of countries excludes former Soviet Republics that did not
have membership in the United Nations before 1991 and South Africa, which was excluded from UN
activities due to the UN’s opposition to apartheid and therefore did not vote on resolutions in the UN
General Assembly for the majority of the time period we study. The five permanent members of the
Council are also excluded since they do not experience any variation in Council membership.
The main data for news coverage and Council membership includes the maximum number of years
for which we could obtain news data, 1946–2010. The number of countries in the panel grows from 36
in 1946 to 113 in 2010.18
The data show that a country received an average of almost two articles about its human rights
abuses each year, with the average coverage being much higher during the Reagan and Bush adminis-
trations at 3.5 articles. There is significant variation in coverage across observations ranging from no
coverage to a maximum of 103 articles in a single year (El Salvador in 1982). For any time period, 6%
to 7% of the sample are UNSC members.19 The data also show that approximately 32% of observations
have at least one news article published on human rights in a U.S. newspaper. This peaks during the
Reagan and Bush administrations at 46%.
We will also use data on human rights abuses as reported by the U.S. government. We describe this
data more in detail in Section 6.6.1.20
17See http://www.un.org/sc/list_eng5.asp for a list of all countries that were ever members and the years of their member-
ships. 85 out of the 115 countries in the sample were on the Council as a rotating member at least once during this time.
18Online Appendix Table A.1 lists the Council members for the period of 1981–1992, the years of membership, the level
of alliance and the number of news articles on human rights. Online Appendix Table A.6 lists the 100 observations with the
most human rights news coverage during 1981–1992. We limit the lists to this time period for brevity, since we will later
show that the news distortions occur for the Reagan and Bush administrations.
19See Online Appendix Table A.2 for descriptive statistics by time period.
20Online Appendix Figure A.1 illustrates news coverage of human rights abuses over time. It shows that the average
number of news articles across countries and the total number of news articles for all countries both begin to increase in 1972
and stay high until the early 1990s. The variation across countries increase during the same period. The two vertical lines
indicate the beginning and end of the Reagan and Bush administrations (1981 and 1992) that coincide with the Cold War,
which we will later show to be the period driving our main results.
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6 Results
6.1 Main Results
In this section, we present the estimates of equation (1). We begin by using the full sample, which
covers 1946–2010. Table 1 presents our main results on news coverage. The sample means of the
dependent variables are presented at the top of the table. Our main measure of news coverage is the
number of news articles about country i’s human rights abuses during year t across all newspapers.
In column (1), we present the estimates for the uninteracted U.S. alliance and Council membership
variables. The former is negative, while the latter is positive. However, they are both statistically in-
significant. The interaction of Council membership and alliance is negative and statistically significant
at the 10% level. In column (2), we interact Council membership with the full vector of year fixed
effects to address the possibility that the relationship between the U.S. government and its allies and
the importance of Council membership changed over time. The interaction effect becomes -2.94 and
statistically significant at the 1% level. Column (3) additionally interacts alliance with the vector of
year fixed effects. This is our baseline specification. The interaction coefficient becomes -3.14 and is
statistically significant at the 5% level.21 Taken literally, the coefficient implies that Council member-
ship will reduce the number of reports by 3.14 log-points more for countries that vote with the United
States all of the time relative to countries that never vote with the United States.
Since no country in the sample actually votes with the United States all of the time, a more mean-
ingful comparison is for countries with alliance measures that are one standard deviation apart. At the
bottom of the table, we show that one standard deviation of the alliance measure in the sample used
for the regression is 0.215. Thus, relative to a country that votes with the United States on 21.5%age-
points fewer issues, Council membership reduces the number of articles on human rights abuses by
49% (exp−3.14×0.215−1 = 0.491).
In column (4), we check that our estimates are not driven by outliers by omitting observations
21One may be concerned that very little variation in the baseline specification after controlling for the large number of
fixed effects (and interactions with fixed effects) in the baseline specification. We examine this by using OLS to estimate the
baseline specification with all of the variables other than the interaction of Council membership and alliance. The R-square
is 0.63 (the adjusted R-Square is 0.59). This means that 37% (or 41%) of the variation in news coverage is still unexplained.
Moreover, it is only a slight increase from the less restrictive specification in column (1), where we do not control for the
interactions of Council membership and alliance with year fixed effects. In that case, the OLS estimates produce a R-square
of 0.62 (adjusted R-square of 0.58).
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that are in the top or bottom tenth percentile of the sample distribution of alliance.22 The interaction
coefficient remains negative, is slightly larger in magnitude than the full sample estimate in column
(3), and is statistically significant at the 5% level. In column (5), we additionally exclude countries that
were never on the Council to check that our estimates are not driven by spurious correlations with these
countries. The estimate is similar to before. In Column (6), we also exclude observations in the top
five percentile of the distribution of articles about human rights for each country. This checks that our
estimates are not driven by extreme values in the data. Again, our estimate is similar to the full sample
baseline in column (3). We conclude that our results are not sensitive to outliers in alliance or news
coverage, and are indeed driven by the countries that have been on the Council at least once.
In column (7), we estimate an alternative specification to examine the relationship between alliance
and UNSC membership across alliance levels. For this exercise, we divide countries into three equally
sized groups according to how closely they are allied to the United States. We then interact the medium
allied and most strongly allied dummy variables with UNSC membership. The reference group is the
uninteracted UNSC membership effect, which captures the effect of Council membership for the least
allied group of countries (i.e., the average country in terms of alliance). To allow for enough variation
in the estimate, we do not interact alliance or Council membership with the year fixed effects.23 The
uninteracted Council member effect is 0.18 and statistically insignificant, which means that Council
membership on average has little effect for news coverage for the least allied group. The interaction
with the medium allied group is -0.14. The sign change relative to the least allied group is consistent
with Council membership reducing news coverage for stronger allies. However, the lack of statistical
significance means that the effect is indistinguishable from zero. The interaction coefficient for the
strongest allied group is -0.5 and significant at the 10% level. The three interaction coefficients suggest
that the effect of Council membership on news coverage is roughly monotonic across alliance levels.
Finally, in Appendix Table A.7, we show that the results of Table 1 are robust to using OLS to
estimate a log-linear specification.
22Since approximately 25% of the sample do not vote with the United States on divided votes, this restriction effectively
only drops the top 10% allies.
23In practice, when we interact Council membership and alliance with year fixed effects as in the baseline specification,
the coefficients are nearly identical. The results are available upon request.
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6.2 Alternative Measures of Alliance
In principle, there are many possible proxies for strategic and political alliance with the United States.
We choose to use voting patterns in the General Assembly as our main proxy because the estimates are
relatively easy to interpret. However, our estimates are also robust to several other measures. Table
2 presents the estimates with three alternative measures.24 At the bottom of the table, we present the
mean and standard deviation of each alliance measure. These show that there is substantial variation in
all measures.
Column (1) restates our main baseline results. In column (2), we use time varying measures of
military alliance based on the Correlates of War military alliance measure. “The Correlates of War
Formal Alliance data set seeks to identify each formal alliance between at least two states that fall into
the classes of defense pact, neutrality or non-aggression treaty, or entente agreement. A defense pact
(Type I) is the highest level of military commitment, requiring alliance members to come to each other’s
aid militarily if attacked by a third party. As the labels imply, neutrality and non-aggression pacts (Type
II) pledge signatories to either remain neutral in case of conflict or to not use or otherwise support
the use of force against the other alliance members. Finally, ententes (Type III) provide for the least
commitment and obligate members to consult in times of crisis or armed attack. Each alliance classifies
the highest level of military support that an alliance member pledges to another alliance member”.25
For each year, the database reports the type of alliance between each country and the United States, as
well as the Soviet Union (Russia). For example, 26.7% of the sample is engaged in Type I, 27.2% of
the sample is engaged in Type I or II and 28.4% of the sample is engaged in any military alliance with
the United States. For brevity, we incorporate all of the information from these variables by taking the
first principal component of the three U.S. alliance and three Soviet alliance variables and using it as
another proxy for alliance. To avoid endogeneity, we use a two-year lagged measure of this variable.
Column (2) shows that the interaction of this proxy is also negative and statistically significant at the
10% level.
Another proxy is based on the legal origin variable created by La Porta et al. (1999). This vari-
24Online Appendix Table A.3 presents the correlations across the various measures, and Appendix Table A.4 lists the
countries and their average level of alliance with the United States for each measure during 1981–1992, the period that we
will later show to drive our main results.
25See http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Alliances/alliance.htm.
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able identifies whether the Company Law or Commercial Code has its origins from English common
law, French commercial code, socialist/communist laws, German commercial code or Scandinavian
code. Our proxy for alliance equals one if a country has its legal origins in Europe, but not from
socialist/communist laws (i.e., the origins are from one of the four other categories). This variable
is time-invariant. Column (3) shows that the interaction of this time-invariant proxy is negative and
statistically significant at the 5% level.
In column (4), we use U.S. military aid, measured in log 2012 constant USD, to proxy for alliance.
As with our other time-varying proxies, we use a two year lagged measure to avoid endogeneity. This
measure is motivated by the belief that the United States gives more military aid to its strategic allies.
In the same equation, we control for the two year lag of U.S. economic aid, also measured in log
2012 USD. The interaction of military aid and UNSC is negative, large in magnitude and statistically
significant at the 10% level. This result is consistent with our hypothesis. In contrast, the interaction
of U.S. economic aid and UNSC has no effect, which is interesting, since it suggests that non-military
U.S. aid is not being disproportionally sent to allied countries. In this sense, economic aid is a placebo
alliance measure. The results support our interpretation.
The results in columns (1)–(4) show that our main finding is qualitatively robust to several proxies
of alliance, which supports our interpretation that our main measure, lagged General Assembly voting
patterns, captures the effect of alliance. Note that as before, we present the implied effect of a one
standard deviation difference in alliance at the bottom of the table. Interestingly, the magnitude of the
relative reduction in news coverage due to Council membership is broadly similar across the different
measures of alliance, ranging from -11% to -23%.
Henceforth, we will focus on our main measure.
Note that the sample sizes vary across the estimations in Table 2 because of the different availability
of the alliance proxies.
6.3 The Reagan and Bush Cold War Administrations
Given the large body of evidence of government manipulation of human rights coverage towards the
end of the Cold War discussed in Section 2, one may naturally wonder whether the Reagan and Bush
Sr. administrations drives the full sample results. In this section, we investigate whether the extent of
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government distortion varies over time.
We take an agnostic ex ante approach and begin by dividing the data into two crude periods: the
Cold War and the post-Cold War eras. Table 3 shows the baseline specification estimates for differ-
ent time periods. Panel A column (1) restricts the sample to the Cold War period. The interaction
coefficient is similar in magnitude to the full sample period and statistically significant at the 10%
level. Column (2) examines the post-Cold War period. The interaction effect is small in magnitude
and statistically insignificant. Thus, our findings are specific to the Cold War. This is consistent with
anecdotal evidence. For example, the president of Zaire (renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo
in 1997), Mobutu Sese Seko (in office 1965–1997) was a strong supporter of the United States during
the Cold War and had been repeatedly criticized for human rights abuses. However, during a state visit
to the United States in 1983, United States president Ronald Reagan responded to these criticism by
stating publicly that Mobutu was a “voice of good sense and good will”. Immediately after the Cold
War ended, the State Department began to criticize Zaire’s human rights violations. In 1993 Mobutu
was denied a visa for visiting the United States and said “I am the latest victim of the Cold War, no
longer needed by the United States. The lesson is that my support for American policy [now] counts
for nothing” (Gbadolite, 2011).
Next, we take another crude cut of the data and investigate whether the effects for the Cold War pe-
riod varies between Republican and Democratic administrations. Column (3) shows that the interaction
coefficient for Republican administrations is large in magnitude, negative and statistically significant at
the 5% level. Column (4) shows that there is no effect for Democratic administrations during the Cold
War. Thus, our results are specific to Republican administrations during the Cold War.
From these results, it makes sense to investigate which of the Republican executive administrations
during the Cold War matter the most for our results. To be comprehensive, Panel B presents results
for all administrations. Note that in several cases, there is too little variation for us to estimate our
baseline estimates for one administration alone. In such cases, we group the administration with either
the preceding or subsequent one.
Columns (1)–(3) show that there is little effect from Truman to Carter. In Column (3), we group the
Carter administration with the Nixon and Ford administrations and find that the interaction coefficient
is positive, small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. Column (4) shows that when we group
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the Carter administration with the Reagan administration, the interaction effect becomes negative and
significant at the 10% level. When we restrict the sample in column (5) to only the Reagan administra-
tion, the interaction coefficient stays negative, increases in magnitude and is significant at the 1% level.
This, together with the estimates in columns (3) and (4) suggest that the interaction coefficient is not
significantly negative during the Carter administration, and the effect begins to take place during the
Reagan administration.
In Column (6), we group the Reagan and Bush administrations. The interaction coefficient is
negative, statistically significant at the 1% level and statistically similar in magnitude as the Reagan
administration. If anything, the coefficient increases in magnitude. Thus, the effects we find during the
Reagan administration continues during the Bush administration. In Column (7), we omit 1992, the
last year of the Bush administration and one year after the official end of the Cold War. The estimate
changes little. Thus, later, we will examine all years of the Reagan and Bush administrations and not
distinguish between the Cold War and post-Cold War periods.
In columns (8) and (9), we examine the post Cold War administrations of Clinton and Bush Jr.
The interaction coefficient becomes positive, small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. This
implies that our earlier finding that there is no effect after the Cold War is true in both the democratic
and republican post-Cold War administrations.
In column (10), we examine all years except the Reagan and Bush Sr. administrations (1981–1992).
The estimate is nearly zero in magnitude and statistically insignificant. This is consistent with our other
results that favoring allies on the Council with relatively fewer human rights news articles is a feature
of the two Republican administrations at the end of the Cold War.26
To interpret the magnitude of the effect, we again present the SD of the alliance measure for each
period at the bottom of each column in Table 3. The estimate and SD of alliance in Panel B column
(6) imply that during the Reagan and Bush Sr. administrations, Council membership reduced news
coverage of human rights abuses by 59% more for a country that voted with the United States by one
standard deviation of the sample alliance.
In Table 4, we repeat the estimates in Tables 1 and 2 for the Reagan and Bush Administrations
26The statistically significant estimate for the Reagan-Bush period holds also if one corrects for multiple hypothesis test-
ing across periods. In particular, only the Reagan-Bush estimate survives the Benjamin–Hochberg False Discovery Rate
procedure at the five% level.
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and show that the results for this period are also robust to alternative sample restrictions and measures
of aid. Interestingly, note that column (1) shows that the uninteracted Council effect is positive and
significant during this period. This implies that during the period that drives our main results, news
coverage increased with Council membership for unallied states, whereas the large negative interaction
coefficient shows that it declined with Council membership for strongly allied states.27 Interpreted with
our model, the former is consistent with the presence of a demand effect, and the latter is consistent
with the presence of government distortion.
6.4 Timing of the Effect
Interpreting the association between the interaction of UNSC membership and U.S. alliance and news
coverage as a causal relationship assumes that conditional on the baseline controls, there are no other
factors that are simultaneously correlated with UNSC membership and the degree of political alliance
with the United States that can also affect news coverage. Specifically, for the interaction term to
overstate the true degree of government distortion, the omitted factor needs to reduce the increase in
news coverage from Council membership according to the level of political alliance with the United
States. For very strongly allied countries, this omitted factor needs to cause Council membership to
result in less coverage. In the remaining empirical exercises, we provide evidence that our estimates
are unlikely to be driven by such omitted variables.
First, we show that the main results are unlikely to be driven by spurious correlations. The most
direct way to do so is to estimate the effect for each year prior to and after a country is on the UNSC,
an equation similar to our baseline, except that instead of a dummy variable indicating Council mem-
bership, we create eight dummy variables for two years before Council membership is announced, one
year before it is announced, the year it is announced, each of the two years of Council membership,
one year afterwards, two years afterwards and three years afterwards. We control for the same set of
baseline controls as in equation (1).
27We note that the interactions of Council membership with the medium alliance and strong alliance dummy variables
in column (7) are statistically insignificant. This is likely due to the reduction in sample size. However, the signs and
magnitudes of the coefficients are consistent with the full sample results in Table 1 that the effect of Council membership on
news coverage is likely to be monotonically decreasing with alliance.
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4
∑
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αsCistAit +
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∑
s=−3
βsCist +ΓXist +δt +θi+ εist , (2)
The number of articles for country i, s years since its been on the Council, during calendar year t is a
function of: dummy variables for the number of years since it’s been on the Council, Cist , interacted
with alliance, Ait ; Cist ; a vector of controls, Xist , which includes the interaction of calendar year dum-
mies with alliance and with Council membership; year fixed effects, δt ; and country fixed effects, θi.
As with the baseline estimate, we estimate this log-linear relationship with a poisson regression and
cluster the standard errors at the country level.
Since Council memberships are announced one year in advance and the announcement often results
in news coverage of the country that includes discussion about its human rights practices, the effects
could, in principle, begin the year before Council membership.28 To reduce the noise in these estimates,
we use the restricted sample that omits the strongest and weakest allies as in Table 1 column (4).
We present these results for several time periods, as motivated by the results from Table 3. First,
we examine the main period driving the results. Figure 1a plots the interaction coefficients, αˆs , and
their 95% confidence intervals.29 This figure shows that there is little differential effect prior to Coun-
cil membership or afterwards, but allies experience a relative reduction in coverage during Council
membership. We observe no evidence of pre-trends.
To observe the effect of membership on the level of coverage for allies and non allies separately,
Figure 1b plots the predicted effects for countries that are strongly allied (votes with the United States
are equal to the 90th percentile of the sample distribution) and countries that are weakly allied (votes
with the United States are equal to the 10th percentile of the sample distribution) for the Reagan and
Bush Sr. administrations.30 The figure shows that news coverage for strongly and weakly allied coun-
tries are similar before and after Council membership. However, coverage diverges when these coun-
28Note that in the main analysis, the Council membership dummy variable takes a value of zero for the year of the election.
Thus, if the announcement results in news coverage of human rights abuses, our main results will be attenuated.
We currently exclude the countries with one-year terms in the pre-1965 period. The results are nearly identical with their
inclusion. These are available upon request.
29The interaction coefficients interaction coefficients and their standard errors are presented in Appendix Table A.8.
30These are calculated using the interaction coefficients. For allies, we plot v¯αˆs + βˆs, where v¯ is the 90th percentile of the
distribution in our sample of how often a country votes with the United States on divided votes in the Council. For non-allies,
we plot vαˆs+ βˆs, where v is the 10th percentile of the distribution in our sample of how often a country votes with the United
States on divided votes in the Council.
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tries are on the Council. Coverage increases for weakly allied countries, while it declines for strongly
allied countries.
To formally examine whether the pre-Council and post-Council years statistically differ from the
Council years, we test to see whether the interaction coefficients for each of those periods differ from
the interaction coefficients of the Council years (see Appendix Table A.8 for the coefficients). The
p-values for the two joint tests are reported at the bottom of Figure 1b. They show that we can reject
the null that the pre and post periods are similar to the Council years. Note that we also present the
p-value for the test of whether the interaction coefficients are statistically different from zero for the
Council years. This is conceptually identical to the main exercise which examines the interaction of
alliance and a Council membership dummy variable. We will return to discuss Figure 1c later in the
paper.
We can also examine the timing of the effect in other periods. For brevity, we focus on the predicted
effects of Council membership for the 10th and 90th% allies.31 In Figure 2, we examine all years, the
Truman to Carter administrations (1946-1980), the Clinton administration (1993-2000) and the Bush
Jr. administration (2001-2008). The results for the full sample are unsurprisingly similar to the Reagan
and Bush Sr. administrations. We find little difference between allies before, during or after Council
membership for these periods. Note that for the Truman through Carter period, the predicted effects
seem to diverge for the year prior to membership. However, the p-values at the bottom of the figure
show that the interaction coefficients for the pre-council period are statistically indistinguishable from
the Council period.
The figures in this section support the results in Table 3 that the distortion we detect is driven
by the Reagan and Bush Sr. administrations. Henceforth, we focus on this period for brevity. More
importantly, the timing of the effect supports our identification strategy and mitigates concerns that our
results are driven by spurious correlations.
31The interaction coefficients used to calculate the predicted effects are shown in Appendix Table A.8; and like in the
baseline estimates in Table 1, they use the sample of allies within the 10th and 90th percentiles. They and their 95% confidence
intervals are plotted in Appendix Figures A.5a - A.5d.
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6.5 Additional Controls
In this section, we address the concern of simultaneity bias by controlling for the factors that are most
likely to influence news coverage and be correlated with Council membership.
Table 5 column (1) shows the our baseline specification results for comparison purposes. Column
(2) controls for region-year fixed effects to address the possibility that reader interests and U.S. policy
objectives may shift geographically over time. We use the Hadenius and Teorell (2005) definition,
which divides the world into ten regions according to geo-political characteristics. Column (3) controls
for the institutional quality of foreign countries that may influence U.S. readers’ interests in these
countries, the strategic value of their alliance to the United States and a country’s ability to obtain
Council membership. We use the Polity2 index for constraints on the executive.32 In column (4), we
control for human rights abuse levels as reported by Amnesty PTS. In column (5), we control for income
(as reported by the Penn World Tables). To avoid endogeneity of the contemporaneous measures, we
use a two-year lagged measure of the variables in columns (4)–(5).
The interaction effect is always negative, large in magnitude and statistically significant at the 1%
level. The robustness of our results to additional controls is consistent with our interpretation and goes
against the concern that the main findings are unlikely to be driven by omitted variables.
6.6 Mechanisms
In this section, we provide additional evidence consistent with the presence of government distortion,
as well as evidence that contradicts the main alternative explanations.
6.6.1 U.S. State Department Reports
Since our preferred explanation for the negative interaction effect is that the degree of government
suppression of news coverage of human rights abuses increases with alliance, we examine whether
reports of human rights abuses made by the U.S. government decrease with alliance when a foreign
country enters the Council. While it is beyond the scope of our analysis to quantitatively determine
the contribution of the different policy instruments used by the U.S. government to distort the news
(recall the discussion in Section 2), finding that official government reports respond to U.S. alliance
32Polity2 is an index that measures the autocracy of the executive. It ranges from -10 to 10, where higher values reflect
more democratic governments and is reported by the Polity IV Project.
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and Council membership in a similar way would provide consistent evidence that our empirical strategy
does indeed capture U.S. government objectives.
We examine the U.S. State Department’s Country Reports on the level of human rights practices
of each country. This is an annual publication submitted to Congress and open to the public, including
journalists.33 That journalists are aware of this publication is consistent with the spike in the number
articles about human rights printed in newspapers the day after the reports are announced.34 As the con-
tent is entirely determined by the government, it is one of many instruments by which the government
can influence the media. Our hypothesis implies that Country Reports should favor UNSC members
that are allies relative to those that are less allied to the United States.35 Based on the discussion in
Section 2, we would expect that Council membership should cause the State Department to exaggerate
human rights abuses of non-allies and favorably understate the abuses of allies.
A potential concern from examining State Department reports of human rights practices is that the
reports will capture both government distortion and actual human rights practices. Thus, observing that
these reports vary with alliance and Council membership could mean that either the U.S. government
distorts reports for strong allies on the Council or that strong allies on the Council improve human
rights practices more than less allied countries. To address this, we benchmark the State Department
country reports to those by Amnesty International. Since Amnesty is a non-government organization,
it should not systematically bias its reports based on U.S. government objectives. Both reports are
quantified by the Political Terror Scale (PTS), where lower scores reflect better practices. The PTS
uses a five point coding scheme, where a PTS value of five indicates the most severe abuse. The main
33The United States is the only country that systematically releases its reports to the public. The way in which it gathers
information is not transparent. However, it is generally assumed that the reports are based on information from government
intelligence and diplomatic apparatuses. The wording of the reports also suggest that the information is mostly based on these
sources.
34Appendix Figure A.3 plots the average number of articles over time for each day before and after the Country Reports
are released for the Reagan and Bush Sr. Administrations, which drives our results on news coverage (1981–1992). The
release dates vary year to year. There is a build up in the number of articles starting around five days prior to the release date
of State Department Reports and three days prior to Amnesty reports (the reports are often leaded prior to the official release
date) and a spike the day following the release that tapers off two days later. This suggests that the reports trigger an increase
in news coverage of human rights abuses. However, the total number written between five days prior until three days after the
release of both the State Department and Amnesty reports is approximately fifty reports per year. This is less than 12% of the
421 news articles published per year on human rights abuses during this period. Thus, it seems likely that Country Reports
served as a reference for journalists writing about human rights, but their release did not determine the timing of most news
articles about human rights.
35The notion that the government uses official publications to promote is views is consistent with the recent study by
Latham (2012), which provides evidence that CIA intelligence reports during the Cold war were distorted towards the views
of the executive administration.
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dependent variable is thus U.S. PTS minus Amnesty PTS. A positive difference means that the U.S.
reports a country as having worse human rights practices than Amnesty reports.
Figure 3a plots the interaction coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals during the Reagan
and Bush administrations. The exercise is analogous to our year-by-year estimates for news coverage
in Section 6.4.36 It shows that there is no pre-trend leading up to Council membership, the interaction
coefficients become negative for the two years of Council membership, and then returns to pre-Council
levels.
Figure 3b plots the predicted effect of Council membership for 90th and 10th percentile allies. It
shows that there is little difference between allies and non allies prior to or after Council membership.
However, for the years on the Council the U.S. increases reports of abuses relative to Amnesty for non-
allies. This is consistent with our hypothesis as well as the anecdotal and case study evidence discussed
earlier in Section 2 about how the government behaved during this period.
In the Online Appendix Section B and Online Appendix Figures A.6a – A.7d, we present the results
for other time periods for completeness. The coefficients and standard errors for the figures are shown
in Online Appendix Table A.9.
6.6.2 Alternative Interpretation
The main alternative explanation for our results is the possibility that strongly allied countries im-
prove actual human rights practices (relative to weaker allies) when they enter the Council. This seems
unlikely given that Appendix Table A.10 shows that there is no effect on human rights practices as
reported by Amnesty International. However, to investigate this possibility further, we also examine in-
stitutional outcomes that are potential correlates of human rights practices. We use all of the measures
that are available to researchers today that are reported by non-government agencies. These include
the Civil Liberties and Political Rights indices reported by Freedom House, the Polity2 Index for con-
straints on the executive and the incidence of civil conflict that results in 25 or more battle deaths as
reported by UCDP/PRIO. For Polity2, we follow the literature and use a dummy that equals one if the
36Note that we add a control for Amnesty PTS and use the same sample as in the baseline specification for PTS. This does
not introduce endogeneity since we show that the interaction of Council membership and alliance has no effect on Amnesty
PTS, but it improves the precision of our estimates. See Appendix Section B for a discussion. Also note that for the Reagan-
Bush period PTS estimates, we drop Peru 1982, which is an outlier. Our main result on the interaction of UNSC and alliance
is similar without this omission.
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index is less than zero to indicate that a country is an autocracy.37 Since these variables are indices and
can take negative values, we use OLS to estimate the baseline equation, equation (1).
Table 6 shows that the interaction effect is statistically insignificant for all outcomes. To help
compare the magnitudes of the effects across the different outcomes, we present the standard deviation
change in the dependent variable that results from a one standard deviation change in the interaction
term. The standardized effects are similarly small in magnitude across outcome variables. In terms of
absolute value, the standardized effect ranges from -0.04 to 0.02. In the last column, we examine the
first principal component of all of the institutional measures. As before, we find no effect.
These estimates are inconsistent with the alternative interpretation that our main result is driven by
improvements in the relative human rights practices of strongly allied countries when they enter the
Council.
6.7 Total News Coverage
A potential concern for our interpretation is that the main results are driven by an increase in total news
coverage rather than a disproportional increase in news about human rights abuses. This would then
suggest an alternative mechanism: Council members that are less allied with the United States may
simply be more interesting to readers. If newspapers are space constrained (or if readers are attention
constrained), then an increase in coverage of non-allies would also necessitate a reduction in coverage
of allies. Our prior is that this is unlikely since non-allies would presumably be less interesting to
American readers than allies. Nevertheless, we can investigate this by examining the share of all
coverage that is about human rights abuses as the dependent variable. We examine the number of
articles about human rights abuses as a fraction of the total number of articles about a country in a
given year as the dependent variable. The number of all articles is constructed by searching for articles
that contain a country’s name in a given year. The data show that during 1981 to 1992, a small%age
of all articles about a country are about human rights abuses on average (0.26%). Since the dependent
variable is a fraction, we estimate this regression using OLS. The interaction coefficient is -0.02 and
significant at the 5% level (not presented in tables).
37These variables are provided by the Quality of Government (QoG) dataset. In addition to what is presented here, we
examine a large array of other variables reported by the QoG dataset and find no effect on any of them. These results are
available upon request.
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Similarly, we can examine the effect for each year since Council membership by estimating equa-
tion (2) with the fraction of human rights abuse articles as the dependent variable. Again, we use OLS
for this estimate. The predicted effects for the 90th and 10th percentile allies are plotted in Figure 1c.
We observe the same pattern as for our main dependent variable.38
The results show that our main findings are not solely driven by changes to total coverage. This
supports our interpretation.
6.8 Newswires
In considering the mechanisms driving our result, it is also interesting to note that we find a very large
effect on the coverage of human rights abuses by newswires, which on average report more than four
times the number of stories on human rights abuses than any of the newspapers in our sample. The
interaction coefficient is -13.72 and is statistically significant at the 1% level.39 Since newspapers often
pick up stories from newswires, this suggests that one effective way for the government to distort the
news is to distort coverage by newswires. Unfortunately, we are unable to investigate this more rigor-
ously because it is not possible to systematically distinguish news that are picked up from newswires
from other articles.40
6.9 Additional Results
In addition to the results presented here, we separately examine the extent of the distortion for each
newspaper in our sample. We find that the extent of the distortion is positively correlated with the
quality of the newspaper, which we proxy with the number of Pulitzer Prizes for foreign coverage. That
the government would target the highest quality of newspaper or the paper with the largest circulation is
consistent with our interpretation and the model presented in the Appendix. However, these results are
merely suggestive since they effectively rely on only five observations (newspapers). See the Online
Appendix Section C.
38The coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals are plotted in Online Appendix Figure A.5e.
39The estimate and descriptive statistics for newswires are shown in Online Appendix Table A.11 column (1).
40This means that newswires are not part of the total number of articles that we examine as our main dependent variable.
We also estimate the interaction of Council membership and dummy variables for each year since Council membership.
Online Appendix Figure 11f plots the predicted effects of Council membership for each year since Council membership for
the 90th and 10th percentile allies. We see a similar pattern as with our main results.
The coefficients and standard errors are reported in Online Appendix Table A.12 column (6).
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7 Interpretation and Alternative Explanations
The empirical findings that Council membership reduces news coverage of human rights abuses for
strongly allied countries, while increasing coverage for countries that are not allied during the Reagan
and Bush Sr. administrations are consistent with the presence of demand effects and government distor-
tion in the framework discussed in Section 3. Within the context of this model, the negative interaction
effect of Council membership and alliance is consistent with the presence of government distortion
(for the Reagan and Bush Cold War administrations). That said, it is beyond the scope of our study to
be conclusive about the mechanisms driving the empirical results. In this section, we discuss several
alternative explanations and the necessary conditions for reconciling them to the empirical results.
One natural alternative explanation is that the U.S. government used news coverage of human rights
abuses to buy votes on the Security Council. This would cause Council membership to reduce news
coverage of strongly allied countries if the most strongly allied countries in the General Assembly (from
where we take our measure of alliance) are the marginal voters on the Security Council. Although such
mechanisms are possible, the simplest versions of it seem inconsistent with our finding. In particular,
standard vote buying models predict that the U.S. government should mainly target the “swing voters”
– countries that are most likely to change their voting behavior in response to favorable coverage, not
countries already inclined to do so. Such models are difficult to reconcile with the finding that Council
membership increases news coverage of human rights abuses for countries that are not allied with the
United States (see Figure 1b).41
Relatedly, it is possible that newspaper readers themselves feel nationalistic about Council members
and endogenously demand more positive news coverage about allies and more negative one about non-
allies. In this case, a profit maximizing newspaper may endogenously respond by slanting its coverage
as, for example, in the works of Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) and Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005).
We are not aware of any evidence that readers’ preferences adjust this way, but the literature on readers’
preferences is very limited, and more work is needed in this area.
If one departs from the standard assumption in the literature that U.S. news outlets are profit maxi-
41We also note that Kuziemko and Werker (2006) find that aid increases for Council members during years that are strate-
gically important to the United States and interpret this as vote buying. Motivated by this, we examine U.S. foreign aid as the
dependent variable in our baseline specification and find that the interaction coefficient is small in magnitude and statistically
insignificant. Thus, there is no obvious evidence of vote buying.
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mizing, then our results are also consistent with journalists or the management of newspapers distorting
coverage. For example, they may feel patriotic about allies that are on the Council – i.e., it is in the
best interest of the United States to not portray important allies poorly. This is an interesting avenue to
pursue in future research. Another possibility is that newspapers rely on U.S. State department infor-
mation and their pattern of coverage is primarily driven by State Department news releases. It seems
reasonable that profit-maximizing newspapers would put some weight on these reports since they con-
tain valuable information that is otherwise costly to acquire, which could lead to distortions even in the
absence of any direct government influence or interactions. This mechanism by itself, however, does
not explain why the U.S. department chooses to increase unfavorable news coverage for non-allies and
decrease coverage for allies once they get on Security Council. Our model provides a possible rationale
for why the State department would choose such a policy.
8 Conclusion
This paper explores the possibility that the government can systematically distort news coverage from
independently owned media outlets in the United States. Using data from 1946 to 2010, we show
that membership on the UN Security Council increased news coverage of the human rights abuses of
foreign countries when they are not politically allied to the United States. In contrast, for countries
that are strongly allied to the United States, membership reduced news coverage of bad behavior. We
argue that these results are consistent with government distortion. However, these distortions are only
present during the latter part of the Cold War under the Reagan and Bush Senior administrations.
Interestingly, this is also the period for which there is a large body of archival evidence documenting
the government’s intent and methods for distorting news coverage of human rights behavior according
to foreign countries’ strategic alliance with the United States.
These results provide novel and rigorous evidence that government distortion can systematically
exist (albeit for a finite period of time) in a highly competitive media market amongst independently
owned media. For policymakers and practitioners, our results may produce mixed feelings of unease
and reassurance. On one hand, the presence of systematic government distortion in U.S. media content
is consistent with the fear that government distortion can impede the media’s ability to monitor the
government on behalf of its consumers. That this can occur in a democratic regime known for media
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independence suggests that market forces are not always a sufficient guarantee against government
influence. Note that the United States has one of the largest and most competitive media markets in the
world (Djankov et al., 2003). On the other hand, that we only find distortions for a twelve-year period
suggests that perhaps government distortion would not have been sustainable over time.
The results and limitations of our study suggest several avenues for future research. First, as data
from more recent years become available, it would be interesting to examine whether similar effects
exist for the Obama administration during its wars in the Middle East, when human rights of belligerent
nations have received significant press attention. Another important line of inquiry is to understand the
conditions under which a democratically elected government can systematically distort the news. Our
finding that there is distortion during the latter part of the Cold War together with the recent work of
Gentzkow et al. (2015), which finds that historically in the United States, the government in power has
little effect on news composition, show that there is variation in government distortion even within one
political system.
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Figure 1: The Effect of UNSC × Years Since Council Membership on News Coverage during the
Reagan and Bush Sr. Administrations
(a) The Coefficients for UNSC × Years Since Council Membership
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(b) The Predicted Effects of Council Membership for 90th and 10th per-
centile Allies on # of Articles about Human Rights Abuses
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Figure 3: The Effect of UNSC × Years Since Council Membership on Human Rights Country Reports
(U.S. PTS - Amnesty PTS) during the Reagan and Bush Sr. Administrations
(a) The Coefficients for UNSC × Years Since Council Membership
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(b) The Predicted Effects of Council Membership for 90th and 10th percentile Allies
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Online Appendix
A Model Setup
Our model of media coverage is a close adaptation of Prat and Stromberg (2011, section 5), and we
mostly follow their notation. We consider a simple two-period model with no discounting. An in-
cumbent U.S. government has type θUS, which is the same in both periods. At the end of period one,
U.S. voters decide whether to keep the incumbent or replace it with a challenger. Both the incumbent’s
and the challenger’s types are drawn from a uniform distribution which takes values on [0,1] . Neither
type is observed directly by voters. Voters make inferences about the incumbent’s type from the U.S.
government’s voting record in the UN General Assembly and from news coverage of U.S. allies in the
UN. Higher θUS corresponds to the U.S. government being “better” from the point of view of the of
domestic voters.
There are four main groups of players in our model: the U.S. government, foreign governments,
U.S. voters and the U.S. media. We discuss each of these groups in turn.
A.0.1 U.S. government
The U.S. government cares about two objectives: i) passing the foreign policy issue that it favors in the
UN, and ii) rents associated with being in office. It has two instruments at its disposal to achieve its
goals. The first instrument is its vote on a given issue. The second is the distortion of newspapers to get
favorable coverage. We assume that the U.S. government votes sincerely and focuses on the incentives
to distort the news coverage.42
A.0.2 Foreign governments
We assume that there are N + 1 foreign countries and each country n can be one of the two types,
either “bad” (θn = 0) or “good” (θn = 1). For concreteness, we assume that each country’s type is
drawn ex-ante independently and is equally likely to take either type. In the UN, the U.S. and foreign
countries vote on a large number of resolutions. Each issue, x j, takes a value which is being drawn
from a uniform distribution on [0,1] . The payoff for a country of type k ∈ {0,1,US} if the resolution j
42It is possible to extend this model to account for strategic voting by the U.S. and show that the main insights continue to
hold in that case. This extension is available upon request.
0
is passed is (
1
4
− (x j−θk)2
)
. (3)
The payoff if a resolution is not passed is normalized to zero.
Under the assumption that countries vote sincerely, this convenient formalization means that the
U.S. votes with a country of type θk = 0 with probability 1− θUS and with a country of type θk = 1
with probability θUS. Since we assume that the number of resolutions is large, the observed frequency
of voting with country k reveals the degree of alliance with the United States, AUS,k = |θUS − θk|,
perfectly.
Out of N+1 foreign countries, one is randomly selected to be on the Council. Without any loss of
generality, we denote this country by n = N+1. In this model, the only distinction between being and
not being on the Council is that more U.S. voters will be interested in reading the news about countries
on the Council.43
Foreign governments of type θn = 0 are repressive and commit human rights abuses. Governments
of type θn = 1 are not repressive and do not abuse human rights.
A.0.3 U.S. Voters
U.S. voters do not observe foreign governments’ types or the U.S. government’s type directly. Voters
read newspapers and they become informed about the type of the foreign government and how closely
it is allied with the United States with some probability. We assume that there are two groups of voters.
Group 1 reads news about all foreign countries. Group 2 reads only about foreign countries that are
“powerful”, i.e., on the UN Security Council.44 Let m1 and m2 be the strictly positive fraction of voters
in groups 1 and 2, respectively.
In the next section, we describe how voters become informed. Based on media coverage, some
fraction s of the population becomes informed about human rights violations of foreign governments
and how frequently that government voted with the United States. Both pieces of information, there-
43One can make the case that, in general, more information will be revealed about a country’s type when it is on the
Security Council, for example, because policy deliberations generally reflect more important issues. Such mechanisms will
generally strengthen the effect we consider in this model.
44As in Prat and Stromberg (2011), one can allow for an arbitrary number of groups and issues that are policy-relevant.
We focus on foreign news given the nature of the data in the empirical section, but the main implications of the model are
potentially applicable to domestic news as well.
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fore, perfectly reveal the type of the incumbent, θUS. A fraction, 1− s, remains uninformed, and their
posterior beliefs about the incumbent type remains unchanged, with the expected value of 1/2.
The expected utility from keeping the incumbent in office in period 2 is E [θUS], where E is the
expectation given the information that each voter has. The utility from selecting the challenger is
E [θ ′US]+δ , where E [θ ′US] is the expected challenger’s type and δ is an idiosyncratic characteristic of
the challenger. We assume that δ is uniformly distributed on [−1/2,1/2] .
For brevity, we focus on sincere voting. Since θ ′US is drawn from the same distribution as θUS, the
uninformed voters vote for the incumbent if −δ ≥ 0, which occurs with probability 1/2. The informed
agents vote for the U.S. government if θUS− 1/2− δ ≥ 0. The δ to satisfy this condition is realized
with probability θUS. Therefore, the probability of re-election of the incumbent, µ, is
µ = sθUS+(1− s) 12 . (4)
We study how voters become informed in the following section.
A.0.4 Mass Media
We now consider the media market. The main idea is that bigger news coverage about any country
increases the fraction of voters informed about it. We follow the arguments of Prat and Stromberg
(2005, 2011) and Stromberg (1999, 2004a, 2004b) . Let qn be the amount of news coverage for country
n. A reader buys the newspaper based on the amount of coverage and on idiosyncratic characteristics.
The reader knows that if he buys a newspaper with qn stories about country n, he will find the news
to be entertaining and the information to be relevant with probability ρ (qn), where ρ is an increasing
function. If the reader finds the information entertaining, he obtains 1 unit of utility. Let εi be the
reader’s exogenous idiosyncratic valuation of newspapers, which is uniformly distributed on [0,1] . If
the price of the newspaper is p, the reader buys it if
ρ(qn)− εi ≥ p.
For simplicity, we assume that ρ (q) = q and the parameters of the model are such that in equilibrium,
q ≤ 1. Thus, if the newspaper has qn news about country n, the probability that a reader is interested
2
in country n is max{q− p,0} . Once a reader buys the newspaper, he learns that θn = 0 and the degree
of alliance of that country with the United States, AUS,n, which is sufficient for inferring the true type
of the U.S. government, θUS.
As in Prat and Stromberg (2005, 2011), we assume that newspapers operate an increasing returns
to scale technology, since there are costs of gathering news and writing a story which is independent
of the number of newspaper copies sold. We assume that news cannot be fabricated, and it is therefore
impossible to write about human rights violations for countries for which θn = 1. For countries that
commit human right violations (θn = 0), newspapers select the optimal amount of coverage. The cost
of publishing qn stories is
γ
2
q2n+ m˜(qn− p)d,
where d reflect the cost of distribution, γ > 0 is a parameter, and m˜ = m1 +m2 for a country on the
Security Council and m˜ = m1 for any other foreign country. Here, the first term is the fixed cost that is
independent of the number of copies and the second term represents constant marginal costs, d, which
are proportional to the demand for newspaper, m˜(qn− p) . The profit for the newspaper from publishing
qn news is then
Π(qn) = (p−d) m˜(qn− p)− γ2q
2
n. (5)
For simplicity, we assume that there is only one newspaper and that p is exogenous and greater than
d. Both of these assumptions can be relaxed along the lines suggested by Stromberg (2004a, 2004b).
Before we characterize the equilibrium with news manipulation, it will be informative to describe
the equilibrium when the government does not interfere. In this case, the optimal news coverage qˆn
maximizes (5) for each n for which θn = 0. It is straightforward to see that qˆn satisfies
qˆn =

0 if θn = 1
1
γ (p−d)m1 if θn = 0 and n≤ N
1
γ (p−d)(m1+m2) if θn = 0 and n = N+1
. (6)
This implies that news coverage of human rights abuses is higher if the country joins the Council. To
make sure that qˆn− p are well defined probabilities when θn = 0, we assume that (p,d,m1,m2,γ) jointly
3
satisfy
1
γ
(p−d)m1− p > 0,
1
γ
(p−d)(m1+m2) < 1.
To find the probability with which the U.S. incumbent retains power, we need to find the number
of informed voters. We start with group 2. In the context of our model, if the country on the Security
Council does not commit any human rights violations, then no news coverage is available and all voters
in group 2 retain their prior beliefs that the probability that the U.S. government is of type 1 is 0.5.45
If the country committed human rights violations, then fraction 1γ (p−d)(m1+m2)− p of voters in
group 2 will see the news and learn that the true type of the U.S. government is θUS. The fraction
1−
(
1
γ (p−d)(m1+m2)− p
)
remains uninformed and retain the prior that the U.S. government is of
type 1 with probability 0.5.
Next, we turn to voters in group 1. A voter learns the type of the U.S. government if she spots
news coverage for at least one country. Suppose that out of the N countries, N˜ commit human rights
violations and the country on the security council is also type θN+1 = 0. Then the probability that she
does not spot any news coverage is and retains her prior belief is
(1−max{ρ (qˆ1)− p,0})× ...× (1−max{ρ (qˆN+1)− p,0})
=
(
1−
(
1
γ
(p−d)m1− p
))N˜(
1−
(
1
γ
(p−d)(m1+m2)− p
))
.
Then the total share of informed voters who learn the type of the U.S. government, s, is
s =
(
1−
(
1−
(
1
γ
(p−d)m1− p
))N˜(
1−
(
1
γ
(p−d)(m1+m2)− p
)))
m1
+
(
1
γ
(p−d)(m1+m2)− p
)
m2.
45In principle, the lack of news about country n can be an informative signal about country n, since in our model, all news
is assumed to be bad news. For simplicity, we assume that readers update their beliefs about country n (and about the U.S.
government) only if they read the news about this country and if they find the news entertaining. In a richer model in which
good news can be generated about good countries, this issue does not arise and the analysis of that model is very similar to
the one presented in this section. Since our empirical strategy allows us to identify only bad news, we focus on this simpler
set up.
4
Note that this pins down the probability of the U.S. incumbent retaining power, as given by (4).
A.0.5 Equilibrium with manipulation
Next, we turn to describing the equilibrium with manipulation. We keep the basic structure of the game
the same as before. We introduce one more stage, following the logic of Besley and Prat (2006), in
which the U.S. government can offer a transfer T (∆n) to the newspaper and suppress ∆n news from
publication.46 The newspaper can either reject the transfer and publish its profit-maximizing news
quantity or accept it and publish at most qn. We keep the rest of the model as above.
Let s
(
{qn}N+1n=1
)
be the fraction of voters who are informed if country n has qn reports of human
rights abuses. Suppose that R is the value of the incumbent to remain in power, which is strictly positive.
Then the incumbent solves
max
{qn}N+1n=1
[
s
(
{qn}N+1n=1
)
θUS+
(
1− s
(
{qn}N+1n=1
)) 1
2
]
R−
N+1
∑
n=1
T (qˆn−qn) (7)
subject to
T (qˆn−qn)+Π(qn)≥Π(qˆn) for all n
and
qn ≤ qˆn.
Here, the first constraint is a best response for the newspaper that agrees to suppress ∆n = qˆn−qn
news only if its profits from doing so exceed the profits from rejecting the offer. The second constraint
ensures that the newspaper cannot publish more news than the newspaper had originally planned and,
in particular, that no human rights violation stories can be fabricated for countries θn = 1.
This problem is, in general, not well behaved. Function s is neither concave nor convex, which
makes the analysis harder. The problem simplifies when we focus on the empirically relevant case
when the number of countries is large. In this case, it is easy to show that it is (approximately) not
optimal to distort countries that are not on the Security Council. The reason for this is as follows.
Note that the probability that a voter in group 1 is not informed about the type of the U.S. government
46As in Besley and Prat (2006), the bribe that the U.S. government pays to a newspaper is not necessarily a monetary trans-
fer, but can be different forms of non-pecuniary benefits that affect newspaper profits, such as offering exclusive interviews
with the incumbent or leaking valuable political information to the newspaper.
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is (1−max{ρ (q1)− p,0})× ...× (1−max{ρ (qN+1)− p,0}) . When N is large, so is the number of
countries which violate human rights, N˜. If the probability that newspapers report human rights viola-
tion for such countries is positive, max{ρ (qn)− p,0} > 0, the fraction of uninformed types in group
1 becomes very small. The only way to substantially change the fraction informed is to significantly
suppress news for a large number of countries, which becomes prohibitively costly for a large N.
Formally, let {q∗n}N+1n=1 be the equilibrium quantities of news that are a solution to (7). We have the
following result, which we formally prove in the Appendix.
Lemma Suppose N is large. Then q∗n ≈ qˆn for n = 1, ...,N
Next, we focus on the distortion of news for a foreign country on the Council. Let s1
(
{qn}N+1n=1
)
and
s2 (qN+1) be the fraction of informed citizens in groups 1 and 2. When q∗N+1 is interior, the first order
condition for q∗N+1 is
[
∂
∂qN+1
s1
(
{q∗n}N+1n=1
)
+
∂
∂qN+1
s2
(
q∗N+1
)](
θUS− 12
)
R+(p−d)(m1+m2) = q∗N+1.
For the reasons explained in the proof of Lemma A.0.5, as N → ∞, ∂∂qN+1 s1
(
{q∗n}N+1n=1
)
→ 0 and
therefore for large N, we can ignore this term. Since s2 (qN+1) = m2 (qN+1− p) , the above expression
becomes
q∗N+1 = (p−d)(m1+m2)+
(
θUS− 12
)
Rm2.
Since q∗N+1 ≤ qˆN+1, this condition holds only for
(
θUS− 12
) ≤ 0. For (θUS− 12) > 0, the optimal
news suppression is zero, q∗N+1− qˆN+1 = 0.
This result allows us to compare news coverage of a country on the Council and an identical country
not on the security council. If this country is of type 1, there is obviously no news coverage of human
rights violations in any case. If the country is of type 0, the difference in coverage ∆ is given by
∆= (p−d)m2︸ ︷︷ ︸
demand effect
−max
{(
1
2
−θUS
)
Rm2,0
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
distortion effect
.
This formula shows that news coverage is determined by two effects when a country gets on the
Security Council. The “demand effect” leads to an increase in coverage since more people want to read
6
about the country on the Security Council. The “distortion effect” leads to a decrease in coverage for
allies that violate human rights. Moreover, the closer the United States is allied to the foreign country
(i.e., the lower θUS), the stronger this effect will be. Since distortion occurs if θUS ≤ 12 and the foreign
country on the Security Council is of type 0, which happens with joint probability 1/4, in expectation
the distortion effect is positive. We summarize these findings in the theorem
Theorem
For a repressive country not allied with the United States, news coverage of its human rights violations
increases when it enters the Security Council. The magnitude of the increase declines with the degree
of alliance. If the benefit of being in power, R, is sufficiently large, then news coverage falls for close
allies when they enter the Council.
The empirical analysis investigates whether these relationships are present in the data.
Proof of LemmaA.0.5
Let q∗n(N) be the solution to (7) and qˆn(N) be defined by (6) for a given N. We will show that qˆn(N)−
q∗n(N)→ 0 a.s. as N → ∞, which is the formal sense in which lemma A.0.5 holds. Let N˜(N) be the
number of countries that commit human rights violations. By the law of large numbers, the fraction
of countries which commit human right violations, N˜(N)/N→ 1/2 a.s., as N→ ∞. For the rest of the
proof, we drop the explicit conditioning on N, but q∗n,qn, N˜ are all understood to be functions of N.
The proof goes in two steps. First, we will show that out of countries that commit human rights
violations, it is not optimal to distort at least half of them by more than some small δ . The cost of
suppressing qˆn−q∗n news is
T (qˆn−q∗n) ≥ (p−d)m1 (qˆn−q∗n)− γ
[
(qˆn)
2
2
− (q
∗
n)
2
2
]
= (qˆn−q∗n)
[
(p−d)m1− γ2 (qˆn+q
∗
n)
]
= (qˆn−q∗n)
[
(p−d)m1− γ2 (2qˆn+(q
∗
n− qˆn))
]
=
γ
2
(qˆn−q∗n)2 ,
where in the third equality we used the fact that qˆn solves (6). Pick some δ > 0. If qˆn − q∗n > δ ,
then T (qˆn−q∗n) ≥ γ2δ 2. Suppose there are at least N˜/2 countries which committed human rights
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violations and for which the equilibrium distortion is qˆn − q∗n > δ . Then the total cost of bribing,
∑N+1n=1 T (qˆn−qn) ≥ N˜γ4 δ 2. Since the total benefit of remaining in power is R, if N (and hence N˜) is
sufficiently large, then γ4 N˜δ
2 > R and the sum of bribes exceeds the total benefit of remaining in power,
which is suboptimal. Therefore, for at least N˜/2 countries in equilibrium qˆn−q∗n < δ .
Now we can show that it is not optimal to distort any country not on the UNSC by more than δ .
Without any loss of generality, we show that it is not optimal to do so for country 1 because the optimal
news distortion for this country should satisfy
[
s
(
{q∗n}N+1n=1
)
θUS+
(
1− s
(
{q∗n}N+1n=1
)) 1
2
]
R−T (qˆ1−q∗1)
≥
[
s
(
qˆ1,{q∗n}N+1n=2
)
θUS+
(
1− s
(
qˆ1,{q∗n}N+1n=2
)) 1
2
]
R,
where the right hand side represents benefits of not distorting country 1 at all, and the left hand side is
the benefit from distorting. Alternatively, it can be written as
[
s
(
{q∗n}N+1n=1
)
− s
(
qˆ1,{q∗n}N+1n=2
)](
θUS− 12
)
R (8)
≥ T (qˆ1−q∗1) .
For any combination of news coverage {qn} , the fraction of uninformed agents in group 1 is given
by
s
(
{qn}N+1n=1
)
= [1− (1−max{q1− p,0})× ...× (1−max{qN+1− p,0})]m1
+(qN+1− p)(m1+m2) .
Pick δ < 1γ (p−d)m1. From the first step, if N is sufficiently large, there are N˜/2 countries for
which 1 ≥ q∗n− p ≥ qˆ− p− δ > 0 where qˆ = 1γ (p−d)m1. Therefore, for any q1, s
(
q1,{q∗n}N+1n=2
)
≥[
1− (1− (qˆ− p−δ ))N˜/2
]
m1 which goes to m1 as N˜→∞. This implies that s
(
{q∗n}N+1n=1
)
−s
(
qˆ1,{q∗n}N+1n=2
)
→
1 and hence from (8) qˆ1−q∗1→ 0 as N→ ∞.
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B U.S. State Department and Amnesty Country Reports
In Appendix Table A.10, we first examine each PTS score separately by replacing the dependent vari-
able in our baseline equation, equation (1), with the U.S. PTS score, the Amnesty PTS score, or the
difference between these two scores, using the full sample of estimates. Column (1) shows that there is
no interaction effect on Amnesty PTS. Column (2) shows that the effect on U.S. PTS is negative, large
and significant at the 1% level. Column (3) shows a similar effect on the difference between U.S. and
Amnesty PTS score. This is not surprising given the results in columns (1) and (2). Given that column
(1) shows that Amnesty PTS is not an outcome of the interaction of Council membership and alliance,
we control for it in column (4) to allow the difference between U.S. and Amnesty PTS to vary by the
level of human rights abuses. Controlling for Amnesty PTS allows us to compare the effect of Council
membership and alliance on the difference between U.S. and Amnesty PTS for two countries with the
same Amnesty PTS score. The interaction coefficient when we add this control is similar to that of
column (3).
In column (5), we restrict the sample to the Reagan and Bush administrations, which drive our main
results. We find that the interaction coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.
This is consistent with our hypothesis.
In columns (6) - (8), we examine the other time periods in the data. Note that since PTS data begin
in 1976, the only pre-Reagan administration we can examine is Carter. The interaction coefficient in
column (6) is also negative and statistically signifiant. In columns (7) and (8), we find no effect for the
Clinton and Bush Jr. administrations, which show that the distortion in State Department Reports did
not persist into the post-Cold War Period.
To further investigate the effect for the Carter administration, we plot the year-by-year estimates in
Appendix Figure 8b. As before, we also plot the predicted effects for the 90th and 10th percentile allies
in Appendix Figure 9b. The figure shows no pattern, which suggests that the interaction coefficients
in Appendix Table A.10 column (6) may not be meaningful. Another possible reason for the lack of a
systematic pattern year by year is that the sample size for the Carter administration is very small as it
only covers four years.
The coefficients and standard errors for the figures shown in this section are presented in Online
9
Appendix Table A.9. Online Appendix Figures 8 and 9 plot the interaction coefficients and their 95%
confidence intervals, and the predicted effects for the 90th and 10th percentile allies.
C Distortion and Newspaper Quality
A natural question that follows from the main analysis, which focuses on the total number of news ar-
ticles across papers, is whether the degree of distortion in each newspaper is correlated with the quality
of foreign news reporting or a newspaper’s reputation. For example, Besley and Prat (2006) argues that
in the presence of government manipulation, the government will focus its efforts on newspapers with
good reputations. This may be because distorting the coverage of high quality newspapers will have a
larger impact on reader perceptions because readers place more trust in high quality newspapers. In the
context of our study and model, it can also be because readers who are interested in foreign news may
be more likely to read newspapers with a good reputation for foreign news coverage.47
To explore this, we examine the correlations of the estimated coefficients across for each newspaper
with a proxy for the quality of foreign journalism: the number of Pulitzer Prizes in International Report-
ing for each newspaper from the beginning of the prize in 1942 until the end of the Cold War in 1992.
Online Appendix Table A.11 columns (1)-(6) present the estimated interaction effects on newswires,
the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, The Chicago Tribune and The L.A. Times.
The estimated interaction effect is negative for all papers, but varies in magnitude and precision.
Next, we use a bivariate regression to estimate the correlations between the estimated effects for
each paper and the quality measure. Online Appendix Figure A.9 plots the respective regression line
and residuals. Consistent with our framework, it shows that the degree of distortion (the absolute value
of the interaction coefficient) is larger for newspapers with more Pulitzers. Note that the bivariate
regression coefficient is not statistically significant. This and the fact that we only observe six data
points means that these results should be carefully interpreted as suggestive evidence.
We also estimate the interactions of Council membership and dummy variables for each year since
Council membership for each paper. The interaction coefficients and standard errors are presented in
Online Appendix Table A.12. Online Appendix Figure A.7 plots the interaction coefficients for each
47It is straightforward to extend the framework presented in the Online Appendix to incorporate newspaper quality effects.
This is available upon request.
10
paper. From these, we predict the effects of Council membership for 90th and 10th percentile allies.
These are plotted in Online Appendix Figures 11a to 11e. Note that the newswire articles plotted in
Figure 11f are not counted into the total number of articles that we use as our main dependent variable.
11
Table A.1: UN Security Council Members during 1981-1991, Alliance and Human Rights News Cov-
erage
Alliance Country Year # HR News Alliance Country Year # HR News
0.29 Togo 1982 0 0.04 Argentina 1988 19
0.28 Tunisia 1981 0 0.04 Brazil 1988 1
0.28 Philippines 1981 8 0.04 Senegal 1988 0
0.27 Panama 1982 2 0.04 Nicaragua 1984 35
0.27 Niger 1981 0 0.04 Hungary 1992 0
0.25 Mexico 1981 6 0.04 Poland 1982 56
0.25 Uganda 1981 1 0.04 Brazil 1989 6
0.23 Panama 1981 1 0.04 Malaysia 1989 1
0.21 Congo, Dem. Rep. 1982 3 0.04 Senegal 1989 1
0.19 Guyana 1982 1 0.04 Colombia 1989 13
0.19 Jordan 1982 2 0.03 Nepal 1988 0
0.18 Pakistan 1983 3 0.03 Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep. 1988 2
0.15 Thailand 1985 4 0.03 Zambia 1988 0
0.15 Pakistan 1984 12 0.02 Nepal 1989 0
0.15 Togo 1983 0 0.02 Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep. 1989 5
0.15 Congo, Dem. Rep. 1983 2 0.02 Cote d'Ivoire 1990 2
0.14 Egypt, Arab Rep. 1985 0 0.02 Colombia 1990 13
0.14 Egypt, Arab Rep. 1984 1 0.02 Madagascar 1986 0
0.14 Jordan 1983 0 0.02 Congo, Rep. 1986 1
0.14 Malta 1983 0 0.01 Poland 1983 24
0.13 Venezuela, RB 1987 0 0.01 Ecuador 1991 0
0.13 Trinidad and Tobago 1985 0 0.01 Cote d'Ivoire 1991 0
0.12 Argentina 1987 73 0.01 Zimbabwe 1991 1
0.12 Peru 1985 28 0.01 Congo, Dem. Rep. 1991 4
0.12 Malta 1984 0 0.01 Malaysia 1990 1
0.12 Burkina Faso 1984 0 0.01 Cuba 1990 22
0.10 Zambia 1987 0 0.01 Congo, Dem. Rep. 1990 8
0.10 Madagascar 1985 1 0.01 Algeria 1988 3
0.10 Peru 1984 12 0.00 India 1991 9
0.10 Uganda 1982 12 0.00 Venezuela, RB 1992 0
0.09 Ghana 1987 0 0.00 Zimbabwe 1992 0
0.09 Burkina Faso 1985 0 0.00 Bulgaria 1986 1
0.09 India 1985 3 0.00 Morocco 1992 0
0.09 Thailand 1986 3 0.00 German Democratic Republic 1981 1
0.09 Ghana 1986 0 0.00 Cape Verde 1992 0
0.08 Guyana 1983 0 0.00 Cuba 1991 6
0.08 Nicaragua 1983 23 0.00 Romania 1990 21
0.08 Zimbabwe 1984 4 0.00 Romania 1991 1
0.08 Trinidad and Tobago 1986 0 0.00 Ethiopia 1990 2
0.07 Zimbabwe 1983 13 0.00 Algeria 1989 0
0.06 Venezuela, RB 1986 0 0.00 Ethiopia 1989 2
0.06 Congo, Rep. 1987 0 0.00 India 1992 11
0.05 India 1984 2 0.00 Bulgaria 1987 1
0.00 Ecuador 1992 1
Non-Permanent UNSC Members 1981-1992
12
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Figure A.1: # of News Articles about Human Rights Abuses over Time
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Figure A.2: The Fraction of Divided Votes and Votes with the United States in the UN General Assem-
bly
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Figure A.3: The Number of Newspaper Articles on Human Rights Abuses for each Day since the
Release of U.S. State Department and Amnesty Reports (Averages across years, 1981-1992)
25
Figure A.4: The Effects of U.S. Alliance× Years Since Council Membership Dummy Variables on the
# of News Articles of Human Rights Abuses with 95% Confidence Intervals
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Figure A.7: The Effect of U.S. Alliance × the Number of Years Since Council Membership Dummy
Variables on News Coverage of Human Rights Abuses for Each Paper during the Reagan and Bush Sr.
Administrations
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Figure A.8: The Predicted Effects of the Number of Years Since Council Membership Dummy Vari-
ables on News Coverage for the 90th and 10th percentile Allies for Each Paper during the Reagan and
Bush Sr. Administrations
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(a) New York Times
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(b) Washington Post
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(c) Wall Street Journal
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(d) Los Angeles Times
-6
6
Ef
fe
ct
 o
f t
he
 #
 o
f Y
ea
rs
 S
in
ce
 U
NS
C
-2 -1 0 UNSC1 UNSC2 +1 +2 +3
Years Since Membership
Ally Non-Ally
UNSC=0: p=0.XXX,      UNSC vs. Pre: p=0.XXX,     UNSC vs. Post: p=0.XXX
(e) The Chicago Tribune
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Figure A.9: Government Distortion and Newspaper Quality
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